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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 
Appellee McFarland & Hullinger, LC (hereafter "McFarland & Hullinger"), 
disagrees with the statement of the issue in the opening brief of appellants Thomas 
Eleopulos and Cathy Atkin (hereinafter "Appellants"). The issue properly framed is: 
Where Appellants' entire ownership interest in the allegedly 
contaminated gravel pit has been terminated in an unrelated partition 
action, was McFarland & Hullinger entitled to summary judgment on 
Appellants' claims for breach of contract and waste, based on the 
undisputed facts that Appellants suffered no economic loss when the 
property was partitioned, Appellants have not incurred any costs to clean 
up the alleged contamination, and no person or governmental agency has 
made any demand on Appellants to clean up the alleged contamination. 
Standard Of Review 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Because a summary judgment presents questions of law, the Court of Appeals 
reviews the district court's ruling for correctness. Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT 
App 75, 45 P. 3d 520. 
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The issue was preserved for appeal in the district court in McFarland & 
Hullinger's summary judgment motion papers and at oral argument. (R. 250-252, 
253-352,496-510,540) 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
No determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations have been identified. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 1992, McFarland & Hullinger leased a gravel pit (the "Gravel Pit") in 
Tooele County from the Morley Atkin Trust. Sometime during the lease term, all 
of the Morley Atkin Trust property, including the Gravel Pit, became the property 
of Morley Atkin's two daughters, Patsy Atkin and Cathy Atkin, as co-owners. 
Cathy Atkin and her common law husband, Thomas Eleopulos ("Appellants"), 
filed their complaint against McFarland & Hullinger asserting five causes of 
action: (1) breach of contract; (2) waste; (3) conversion; (4) unjust enrichment; 
and, (5) trespass. These five causes of action centered on three allegations of 
wrongful conduct. First, Appellants averred that McFarland & Hullinger removed 
more sand and aggregate from the Gravel Pit than it actually paid for. Second, 
they averred that McFarland & Hullinger removed gold and silver from the Gravel 
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Pit without permission and made no payment for its value. Third, they averred that 
McFarland & Hullinger "dumped pollution" at the Gravel Pit. 
The Course of Proceedings 
McFarland & Hullinger filed its first Motion for Summary Judgment on 
January 30, 2003 (R. 119-121). Appellants filed their opposing memorandum (R. 
125-161) and a supplemental memorandum (R. 181-201) and McFarland & 
Hullinger replied (R. 165-177). After a hearing, the district court granted the 
motion in part and denied it in part. The district court entered summary judgment 
in McFarland & Hullinger's favor on the unjust enrichment and conversion claims, 
and on the contract claim insofar as it was based on the averments that McFarland 
& Hullinger had not paid for all of the aggregate it removed from the Gravel Pit. 
The district court found that there were disputed issues of fact concerning the 
averments that McFarland & Hullinger had "dumped pollution" at the Gravel Pit. 
Accordingly, the district court denied the motion with respect to Appellants' 
claims for waste, trespass and breach of contract for the alleged pollution. An 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment was entered July 28, 2003. (R. 235-
237). This Order is not the subject of this appeal. 
After the district court had entered an order in an unrelated partition action 
between the two co-owner sisters, in Patsy Atkin v. Cathy Atkin, Civil No. 
000300249, Third District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, terminating 
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Appellants' ownership interest in the Gravel Pit, McFarland & Hullinger filed its 
second Motion for Summary Judgment on November 5, 2004 (R. 250-252). The 
parties filed their respective memoranda (R. 377-403, 404-492, 496-510) and a 
hearing was held.1 The transcript of the April 20, 2005 hearing on the second 
summary judgment motion is found at R. 540. The district court granted 
McFarland & Hullinger's motion for summary judgment and entered its Minute 
Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment on February 7, 2005 (R. 520-
523), which was followed by entry of an Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that was signed on February 28, 2005 and entered March 8, 
2005 (R. 524-525). Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on March 25, 2005 (R. 
526-528). 
Statement of Relevant Facts 2 
1. In January 1992, the Morley T. Atkin Trust entered into a lease 
("Gravel Pit Lease") with McFarland & Hullinger for the Gravel Pit in Tooele 
County. The term of the Gravel Pit Lease was 9lA years commencing on January 
2, 1992, and ending on June 30, 2001. (Lease, R. 315-324); Cathy Atkin Depo. at 
8:3-9 (R. 326-332); Complaint f 6 (R. 2-16). 
1
 Appellants did not oppose the dismissal of their trespass claim. 
2
 Appellants did not dispute any of the material facts set forth by McFarland & 
Hullinger in its motion papers: "As a general statement, the recited facts are not in 
dispute for purposes of this motion." See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment at p. 2 (R. 492). 
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2. Cathy Atkin and her sister Patsy Atkin are the daughters of Morley T. 
Atkin, deceased. As beneficiaries of the Morley Atkin Trust, they received co-
ownership interests in the Gravel Pit. The Gravel Pit was part of a larger parcel of 
property, referred to as the aHwy 36 property," that the sisters received from the 
Trust. Cathy Atkin Depo. at pp. 10, 51-53. (R. 326-332). Minute Entry and Order 
on Motion for Summary Judgment at % 2(a) (R. 520-523). 
3. In March 2000, Patsy Atkin sued her sister, Cathy Atkin, in order to 
partition their co-ownership in all of the property from the Morley Atkin Trust, 
including the Hwy 36 property. Patsy Atkin v. Cathy Atkin, Civil No. 300249, 
Third District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah (the "Partition Action"). See 
Verified Petition for Partition of Real Property (R.284-288). 
4. In the fall of 2001, Patsy and Cathy Atkin reached an oral agreement 
to partition and divide their Hwy 36 property. They agreed to divide the property 
along north-south lines. Patsy Atkin was to receive the Gravel Pit on the south end 
of the Hwy 36 property, and Cathy Atkin was to receive the north end of the Hwy 
36 property where she resides. Patsy Atkin Affidavit at Tf 5 (R.279-282). 
5. On September 19, 2001, Cathy and Patsy Atkin signed a written 
agreement, consistent with their oral agreement, to equally divide their Hwy 36 
property. Cathy Atkin agreed that she was to receive the north parcel and Patsy 
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Atkin was to receive the south parcel, including the Gravel Pit. The Agreement for 
Partition Stipulation and Order is found in the record at R. 270-277. 
6. On October 12, 2001, appellants Cathy Atkin and Tom Eleopulos 
("Appellants") filed their complaint against McFarland & Hullinger. Complaint (R. 
2-16). 
7. On September 23, 2003, the Atkin sisters' Partition Action went to 
trial. As plaintiff, Patsy Atkin offered her Exhibit 6 (R. 268), which was a hand-
drawn map designating a proposed division of all of the Morley Atkin Trust 
property, including a division of the Hwy 36 property into two parcels along a 
north-south boundary with each parcel having equal frontage to Highway 36. aThe 
gravel pits" are identified in the south portion of the property, in which Patsy Atkin 
was to receive a 100% interest. 
8. On March 1, 2004, the court entered its Amended Order of Partition in 
the Partition Action. The court partitioned the Hwy. 36 property according to 
Exhibit 6. According to her request, Patsy Atkin was awarded the south portion, 
which includes the Gravel Pit, free and clear of any lien, right or obligation to 
Cathy Atkin. Cathy Atkin received the north portion. This ruling was consistent 
with the expressed desire of Cathy Atkin, who requested the north portion where 
she resides. Consequently, Appellants no longer have any ownership interest in 
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the Gravel Pit. Partition Action Amended Order of Partition (R. 262-266); 
Partition Action, Hearing Transcript (ruling only) September 26, 2003 (R. 253-
260); Minute Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at % 2(c). (R. 
520-523); Summary Judgment Motion Hearing Transcript, February 2, 2005 at p. 4 
-8 (R. 540). 
9. There was no evidence in the Partition Action, which partitioned the 
Hwy 36 property into equal halves, that Patsy Atkin's south parcel, including the 
Gravel Pit, suffered any diminution in value. What made the partition of Patsy and 
Cathy Atkin's respective parcels equal, and thus equitable, in the view of the 
district court, was the fact that each parcel had the same amount of frontage on 
Highway 36. Partition Action Amended Order of Partition (R. 262-266); Partition 
Action, Hearing Transcript (ruling only) September 26, 2003 (R. 253-260); Minute 
Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at f 2(c). (R. 520-523); 
Summary Judgment Motion Hearing Transcript, February 2, 2005 at p. 4 -8 (R. 
540). 
3
 It has never been clear what interest, if any, appellant Thomas Eleopulos 
claimed in the Hwy 36 property. Nevertheless, the intention and result of the 
Partition Action was to partition the Morley Atkin Trust property between the two 
Atkin sisters, free and clear of any competing interests. 
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10. In an accounting she filed in the Partition Action, Cathy Atkin 
acknowledged that she never incurred any expenses associated with McFarland & 
Hullinger's alleged "pollution" of the Gravel Pit, other than fees associated with 
expert witnesses retained by her attorneys in the above-entitled action. See Cathy 
Atkin Accounting (R. 290-293). 
11. No action or order by any private, local, state or federal entity has 
been instituted for cleanup of the Gravel Pit, and Appellants have not been sued or 
named as a party responsible for any cleanup action of the Gravel Pit. Minute 
Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at f 2(d) (R. 520-523). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
While there is no dispute that McFarland & Hullinger signed a written lease 
with the Morley T. Atkin Trust to lease the Gravel Pit, neither a breach of the 
lease, nor McFarland & Hullinger's alleged waste, was established in the district 
court; rather, the district court merely assumed these facts for purposes of deciding 
McFarland & Hullinger's summary judgment motion because these facts were 
immaterial to the motion. 
McFarland & Hullinger makes three related arguments in this brief. First, 
regardless of whether McFarland & Hullinger breached its lease and committed 
waste, the Gravel Pit was part of the south portion of the Hwy 36 property, and 
100% ownership of the south portion of the Hwy 36 property was transferred to 
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Patsy Atkin in the Partition Action. Patsy Atkin makes no claim in this lawsuit. 
When Judge Skanchy partitioned the Hwy 36 property the only issue that 
concerned him, and the only issue raised by the Atkin sisters, was that each sister 
receive equal frontage along Hwy 36. Whether or not the Gravel Pit was 
contaminated, Appellants each took an equal half of the Hwy 36 property without 
any diminution in value or loss of any kind on account of the alleged 
contamination of the Gravel Pit. Appellants no longer own the Gravel Pit, they 
never incurred any costs to clean it up, and no one has ever made a demand on 
them to do so. Consequently, the necessary element of loss or damages is missing 
from Appellants' breach of contract and waste claims. 
McFarland & Hullinger's related second and third arguments are that 
Appellants' claims are not ripe and Appellants lack standing. Appellants' claim 
that some day in the future they may be called upon to clean up the Gravel Pit is 
purely speculative and fails to raise the requisite justiciable case or controversy and 
particularized injury which are necessary to maintain a lawsuit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS SUFFERED NO LOSS WHEN THE DISTRICT 
COURT PARTITIONED THE HWY 36 PROPERTY WITHOUT ANY 
CONSIDERATION FOR APPELLANTS' CLAIM OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION, 
This lawsuit is about the Gravel Pit in Tooele County that McFarland & 
Hullinger leased from the Morley Atkin Trust in 1992. The Gravel Pit at issue in 
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this case is located in the south half of a larger parcel of property, referred to as the 
"Hwy 36 property," which was owned by the Morley Atkin Trust, and thereafter 
co-owned by Morley Atkin's daughters, Cathy Atkin and Patsy Atkin.4 
A year before the present lawsuit was filed, Patsy Atkin sued her sister 
Cathy Atkin in Third District Court in Tooele County to partition all of the 
property that had been left to them by their father, including the Hwy 36 property. 
Patsy Atkin v. Cathy Atkin, Civil No. 300249, Third District Court, Tooele County, 
State of Utah (the "Partition Action").5 Patsy filed an affidavit in the Partition 
Action stating that "[I]n the fall of 2001, an oral agreement was reached with 
[Cathy] and her attorney, Dennis Morell [sic], of Kirton and McConkie, to partition 
and divide the [Hwy 36] property. By virtue of the agreement, the property was to 
be divided among [sic] north-south lines and I would receive the operating gravel 
pit on the south end of the property. [Cathy] stated that I could do as I please with 
this property as she and Tom Eleopolus were residing on the north end."6 
4
 Patsy Atkin has never made a claim against McFarland & Hullinger and is not a 
party to this action. 
5
 McFarland & Hullinger's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 253-352), contains all of the relevant papers from the 
Partition Action, including the September 26, 2003 trial transcript (ruling only) (R. 
260), and the Amended Order of Partition (R. 266). The trial transcript and the 
Amended Order of Partition are also included in the Addendum to this brief at 
Tabs D and E. 
6
 Patsy Atkin Affidavit at 1 5 (R. 282). 
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In October 2001, while the Partition Action was pending, Appellants sued 
McFarland & Hullinger. Their averments that are relevant to this appeal were that 
McFarland & Hullinger had "dumped pollution" on the Gravel Pit, thus allegedly 
breaching the Gravel Pit Lease and committing waste. 
The partition action went to trial in September 2003. At trial, Patsy 
proposed a division of the Hwy 36 property that she illustrated with a map marked 
as her Exhibit 6. Patsy's proposal was to divide the Hwy 36 property as she and 
Cathy had previously decided; Patsy would get the south parcel, including the 
Gravel Pit property, and Cathy would get the north parcel where she lived, which 
is exactly what Cathy had always wanted. The district court adopted Patsy's 
proposal.8 When the district court partitioned the Hwy 36 property, the district 
court gave no consideration to the fact that the south parcel awarded to Patsy Atkin 
might be the site of alleged "dumped pollution," nor that such alleged "dumped 
pollution" affected the relative values of the north and south parcels. What made 
7
 Included in Addendum at Tab C. 
8
 Judge Skanchy presided over both the Partition Action and the present case. 
He, therefore, understood better than anyone else what factors he had considered in 
partitioning the Hwy 36 property. At the hearing on McFarland & Hullinger's 
motion for summary judgment, Judge Skanchy countered Appellants' contention 
that any supposed stigma associated with the Gravel Pit was a factor in dividing 
the property equally between the Atkin sisters. See Hearing Transcript, February 
2, 2005 at p. 8. (R. 540). 
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the two parcels equal, and thus equitable, according to the district court, was the 
fact that each parcel had equal frontage on Highway 36.9 
A soon as the district court partitioned the Hwy 36 property and it was 
apparent that Patsy and Cathy had received their respective north and south halves 
of the Hwy 36 property without any consideration of Appellants' allegations that 
the Gravel Pit was contaminated, McFarland & Hullinger moved for summary 
judgment. The timing was appropriate: (1) Appellants no longer owned any 
interest in the Gravel Pit; (2) Appellants' allegations of environmental 
contamination or stigma damages did not affect the valuation of the property for 
partition purposes; (3) Appellant Cathy Atkin had filed an accounting in the 
Partition Action demonstrating that she had never incurred any costs to clean up 
the alleged contamination; and (4) no person or governmental entity had ever made 
a demand on Appellants to clean up the alleged contamination of the Gravel Pit. 
In other words, after the district court partitioned the Hwy 36 property 
equally between the sisters without any mention (by Cathy Atkin, Patsy Atkin, or 
by anyone else) of any alleged contamination of the Gravel Pit, and Appellants' 
ownership interest in the Gravel Pit was entirely terminated, Appellants' allegation 
that McFarland & Hullinger "dumped pollution" at the Gravel Pit was immaterial. 
Whether or not McFarland & Hullinger "dumped pollution" on the Gravel Pit, 
See Hearing Transcript, 9/26/03 (R. 260). 
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Appellants suffered no damages under their breach of contract and waste claims, 
their claims were not ripe for adjudication, and they had no standing to maintain 
their lawsuit. Consequently, for purposes of this summary judgment motion only, 
the district court could assume, arguendo, that the "dumped pollution" allegations 
were true and that all other material facts were undisputed. 
Elements of a Contract Claim 
"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are: (1) a contract; 
(2) performance by the party seeking recovery; (3) breach of the contract by the 
other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., et al, 20 P.3d 388, 
392 (Utah 2001).10 
Damages for breach of contract seek to place the aggrieved party in the 
same economic position the party would have been in had the contract been 
performed. Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999); Young Electric Sign 
Company v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988). 
10
 The basis for Appellants' breach of contract claim was a provision in the 
Gravel Pit Lease that reads: 
2.3 Compliance with Laws. LESSEE agrees during the term of this 
Lease, at its expense, to obtain and maintain in effect all necessary permits 
and to comply with all applicable, valid statutes, regulations and orders of all 
governmental bodies having jurisdiction over LESSEE or the Leased 
Premises. 
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Elements of a Waste Claim 
Waste is a species of tort that has three elements: (1) an act constituting 
waste; (2) done by one legally in possession; (3) to the prejudice of the estate or 
interest therein of another. Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing 
Company, Inc., 888 P. 2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Hansen v. Green River 
Group, 748 P. 2d 1102, 1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Jowdy v. Guerin, 457 
P. 2d 745 (Az. App. 1969)). 
The measure of damages for waste is the difference in market value before 
and after the injury, or alternatively, the cost of remediation. Jowdy v. Guerin, 457 
P. 2d 745 (Az. App. 1969). 
Even assuming, for argument's sake only, that McFarland & Hullinger had 
breached the Gravel Pit Lease, Appellants' economic position was ultimately no 
different than if McFarland & Hullinger had not allegedly "dumped pollution." 
Cathy and Patsy Atkin received equal halves of the Hwy 36 property with equal 
frontage to Hwy 36 without any consideration of Appellants' claims of pollution. 
Although Appellants asserted that McFarland & Hullinger was not entitled to 
summary judgment because the partition was skewed as a result of stigma 
associated with the Gravel Pit, Judge Skanchy knew better.11 He had, after all, just 
11
 See Tr. 2/02/05 at p. 8 (R. 540). 
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partitioned the Hwy 36 property, and he knew that stigma had nothing to do with 
the partition. 
Importantly, the only costs Appellants ever incurred relative to the "dumped 
pollution," on what is now Patsy Atkin's Gravel Pit property, are costs Appellants 
incurred for analysis of samples taken from the Gravel Pit area after Cathy Atkin 
had already decided to acquire the north half of the Hwy 36 property where her 
trailer is located (not the Gravel Pit area). No regulatory agency has ever 
demanded that the Gravel Pit be cleaned up, nor has Patsy ever made such a 
demand on her sister (or on McFarland & Hullinger, for that matter). The only 
reason Appellants spent anything for sampling and analysis was for the purpose of 
securing expert testimony in support of their breach of contract and waste claims 
against McFarland & Hullinger in this lawsuit. The costs for their expert witnesses 
are not recoverable damages. Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 
2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35 (holding that any amount paid for an expert witness over 
the statutory allowance is an expense of litigation, rather than a taxable cost, and 
not recoverable). 
Contract damages necessarily require an evaluation of the non-breaching 
party's loss by the most direct, practical and accurate method. Even Odds, Inc v. 
Nielson, 448 P. 2d 709 (Utah 1968). It is axiomatic that when there is no loss, 
there are no damages. Appellants suffered no loss. Damages, therefore, were an 
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essential, but missing, element to Appellants' breach of contract claim. See Bair v. 
Axiom Design, L.L.C., et aL, 2001 UT 20, 20 P.3d 388, 392. 
Appellants' claim for waste suffered from the same defect as their breach of 
contract claim. There was no difference in the market value of the Gravel Pit 
before and after the alleged "dumping," as demonstrated by the district court's 
equal division of the Hwy 36 property, and Appellants have no costs of 
remediation. 
IL APPELLANTS' CLAIMS WERE NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION, 
A district court can only decide those claims that are ripe for adjudication. 
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P. 2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 
1981). A justiciable controversy must presently exist, and a claim that is based on a 
hypothetical situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find 
themselves, is unripe for adjudication. See Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P. 2d 741 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT 254, 97 P. 3d 722. 
Appellants have always been unable to dispute the simple fact that no one 
has ever suggested that they are liable to clean up Patsy Atkin's Gravel Pit 
property. Appellants simply assert, hypothetically, that they might suffer liability 
in the future under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. § 6972, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., or the Utah Solid 
351382 l.DOC 16 
and Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-101, etseq. No enforcement 
action was ever filed against Appellants under any of these statutes or their 
implementing regulations. Indeed, no federal, state or municipal governmental 
entity or any citizens group filed, or even threatened to file, any enforcement action 
against Appellants in regard to the Gravel Pit property. In addition, Appellants are 
now past owners, rather than current owners, of the Gravel Pit. 
It is highly unlikely that an enforcement action would be brought by the 
State of Utah against Appellants under the state statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-
112, 19-6-113, and 19-6-821 and implementing regulations) because these statutes 
apply to enforcement actions brought by the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control 
Board against "any person [who] is in violation of any applicable approved 
hazardous wastes operation plan or solid waste plan'5 or the Board's applicable 
requirements and rules. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-112(1). There is no provision for 
enforcement against an innocent, past landowner. Since Appellants never alleged 
that they personally violated any hazardous waste operation plan or solid waste 
plan, it is highly unlikely that an action would be brought against them under these 
state statutes. 
A prior owner can, potentially, be liable under RCRA, but the past owner of 
a treatment, storage, or disposal facility must have "contributed or ... is 
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or 
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disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. 
§6972(a)(1)(B). Again, since Appellants never alleged that they personally 
contributed to any past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or 
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste, it is highly unlikely that an enforcement 
action would be brought against them under RCRA. Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has foreclosed RCRA cost recovery actions with respect to past 
cleanup costs. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
Appellants could potentially be defendants in a CERCLA action, along with 
other owners, operators, generators, and transporters, if it could be shown that they 
owned the subject property "at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance" 
(42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)), but the federal court with exclusive jurisdiction over 
such enforcement action would have to find and allocate liability to Appellants, as 
opposed to other potentially responsible parties, and if Appellants were found to be 
liable, they would then have the opportunity to bring a contribution action against 
other potentially responsible parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). In resolving the 
contribution action, the federal court would allocate response costs among liable 
parties using such equitable factors as the court determined appropriate. Id. 
Consequently, Appellants would have their day in court to seek contribution from 
responsible parties. 
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In summary, no enforcement action has been brought against Appellants 
under the enforcement provisions of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, 
RCRA, or CERCLA, and it is highly unlikely that such an enforcement action will 
ever be brought. If an enforcement action were brought, Appellants could require 
that other potentially responsible parties be joined, and the appropriate court would 
have to decide Appellants' liability. Appellants could even bring a subsequent 
contribution action under CERCLA. None of this, of course, has ever happened 
and such potential enforcement action is purely speculative. 
III. APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS 
LAWSUIT. 
A district court can only adjudicate an actual case or controversy. A 
plaintiff must establish standing in order to maintain a claim before a trial court. 
The general standing rule, often stated by the Utah Supreme Court, is that "a 
plaintiff must have suffered 'some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or 
her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.'" Society of Professional 
Journalist v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987) (quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (alteration in original)). Anyone bringing an 
original proceeding must satisfy the traditional standing test. Society, 743 P.2d at 
1170. The traditional standing requirement is generally justified on the grounds 
that, in the absence of such a requirement, the courts might permit themselves to be 
drawn into disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution, such as hypothetical 
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issues or advisory opinions. Id. Likewise, a party cannot raise the hypothetical 
claims of third parties who are not before the court. Provo City Corp. v. 
Thompson, 2004 UT 14 ^9, 86 P.3d 735. 
It is clear, based on the undisputed facts, that Appellants lacked standing to 
assert a claim for cleaning up Patsy Atkin's Gravel Pit property when no cleanup 
has yet occurred, no cleanup has ever been scheduled, and where, importantly, 
neither the owner of the property, Patsy, nor any governmental agency, has ever 
demanded that the property be cleaned up. In a comparable standing case decided 
by the Utah Court of Appeals, the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing in a 
dispute over ownership of stock when the plaintiff had sold her interest in the stock 
and no longer held a personal stake in the outcome of the ownership dispute. See 
Granite Stone L.C. v. Allen, 2004 WL 2690778, 2004 UT App 435. 
Appellants have no present damages under their breach of contract and 
waste claims; however, they asked the district court to decide a hypothetical 
environmental enforcement case in which the enforcement agency, the 
enforcement mechanism, the potentially responsible parties, the remedy, and the 
damages are unknown. Obviously, Appellants lacked the "particularized injury" 
which is specifically required by Utah courts for standing to maintain a lawsuit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, the district court's Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this 14th day of October, 2005. 
Rosemary J. Beless 
P. Bruce Badger 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
McFarland & Hullinger, LC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 2005,1 caused to be 
deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following counsel of record: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4 Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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McF ARL AND AND HULLINGER, LLC 
and DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY and 
ORDER on MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case no. 010301120 
Judge RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
This Court, having heard argument Defendant McFarland and Hullinger's (Defendant) 
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 2, 2005, with P. Bruce Badger and Rosemary Beless 
appearing on behalf of Defendant and Gregory T. Sanders appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs 
Thomas Eleopulous and Cathy Atkin (PlaintiflFs) and having received and reviewed briefs in the 
matter, finds and orders as follows: 
1) Plaintiffs' claim for trespass is dismissed as Plaintiffs have voluntarily abandoned 
that claim. 
2) Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and waste are likewise dismissed without 
prejudice. The Court bases its dismissal of these claims on the following undisputed facts: 
a) Cathy Atkins and her sister, Patsy Atkins, received an interest in the subject 
property ("Gravel Pit property") as beneficiaries of the Morley T. Atkin 
Trust. The Gravel Pit property was part of a larger parcel of property the 
sisters received from this Trust. 
r.nr,oo 
b) The Defendants leased the Gravel Pit property during the sisters joint 
interest in the property. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached the 
lease and committed acts constituting waste on the Gravel Pit property. 
c) Cathy and Patsy Atkin were adverse parties to a partition action filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County entitled Patsy Atkin 
v. Cathy Atkin, civil no. 020300249. On or about Sepetember 23, 2003, 
the larger parcel of property was partitioned pursuant to a trial. 
Thereafter, on March 1, 2004, this Court entered an Order partitioning the 
property, which Order granted Patsy Atkin the Gravel Pit Property free and 
clear of any lien, right or obligation to Cathy Atkin. This ruling was 
consistent with the expressed desire of Cathy Atkin as to which parcel of 
the larger parcel she desired. Atkin and co-plaintif£ Eleopulous, have no 
ownership interest in the Gravel Pit property. There was no evidence that 
Patsy Atkin incurred a dimunition in value when the larger parcel was 
partitioned. 
d) No action or order by any private, local, state or federal entity has been 
instituted for clean-up of the Gravel Pit property and Cathy Atkin has not 
been sued or named as a party responsible for clean-up action as to the 
Gravel Pit property. 
3) A breach of contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which 
is damages. Breach of contract damages seek to place the aggrieved party in the same economic 
position she would have had if the contract was not breached. Mahmoodv. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 
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(Utah 1999). Similarly, a waste claim requires three elements of proof, one of which is prejudice 
to the estate or interest of another. Waste damages may be measured by the either the cost of 
restoration or the difference in market value before and after the injury. Dugan v. Jones, 724 
P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). 
4) Even assuming for purposes of this motion for summary judgment that the 
Defendant breached the contract and/or committed acts constituting waste, to defeat summary 
judgment, the PlaintiflFs must show damage and/or prejudice to their interest in the Gravel Pit 
property. Here, the PlaintiflFs fail to show any genuine issue of material fact regarding damages or 
prejudice to their interest. The PlaintiflFs have suffered no economic loss from the Defendant's 
breach. While damages may occur in the future if the PlaintiflFs are held liable for clean-up costs 
or otherwise, presently no such damages exist, and as such neither their breach of contract nor 
waste claims are ripe for adjudication. Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722 (Utah 2004). While there 
may have been a difference in market value before and after the injury, such dimunition in value of 
the larger parcel was not raised by PlaintiflFs as damage. Furthermore, Cathy chose not to keep 
the portion of the larger parcel that included the Gravel Pit property, therefore, she will not bear 
the burden of the dimunition in value of the property, if any. 
ORDER 
The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and ORDERS: 
1) the PlaintiflFs' trespass claim DISMISSED with prejudice; and 
2) the PlaintiflFs' breach of contract and waste claims DISMISSED without prejudice; 
3) the Defendants Counsel to prepare an Order for this Court to sign reflecting this 
Minute Entry and Order. 
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DATED this ^ £_ day of February, 2005. 
By the Court: 
<SS5 ,: 
RANDAL!, K S 
Third pistrict Court Judge 
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MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
C0520 
Rosemary J. Beless (A0272) 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendant McFarland & Hullinger, LC 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and CATHY 
ATKIN, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 010301120 
McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC ) Judge Randall Skanchy 
and DOES I-X„ ) 
Defendants. 
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing on February 2, 2005. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Gregory J. Sanders. 
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC was represented by its counsel, P. Bruce Badger and 
Rosemary J. Beless. The Court having read and considered the supporting and opposing motion 
papers, and having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised, now enters its 
Order consistent with its Minute Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
February 7, 2005. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted: 
1. Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for breach of contract is dismissed without 
prejudice; 
2. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for waste is dismissed without preiudice; 
3. Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for trespass is dismissed with preiudice. 
DATED this £% day of _ f P*N»> T _, 2005 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Randall iz. Skanchy 
Third District CourT1' 
Approved as to form: 
Gregory p ^afnclers 
Kipp and Christian 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Thomas Eleopulous 
and Cathy Atkin 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the ft '-~ day of February 2005,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Margaret R. Wakeham 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Case No. 000300249 
'RULING ONLY FOR HEARING SEPTEMBER 26,2003* 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE RANDALL SKANCHY 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
COPY 
TOOELE, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 26,2003 
JUDGE RANDALL SKANCHY PRESIDING 
*PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY* 
THE COURT: The survey assists in that particular 
case, at least to know that. I ask that only because frankly, 
having heard all of the testimony I'm inclined to accept the 
proposal that exists in front of me today as I look on this 
sheet, at least as far as the north and the south portions are 
concerned. It seems equitable for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is it attempts to coincide with the desires of 
Kathy Atkin to not have the gravel pit and to make some 
accommodation for that, otherwise it seems to me to be an 
entirely equitable split. The argument that the frontage road 
should be equally divided is compelling to me, I mean this is 
access that creates access to property and that seems to be 
another driving reason why I believe equity would require to be 
split, having said all of that. If a survey will need to be 
done anyway, creates some opportunity to - this is what we're 
going to do. I don't see it making a difference in terms of 
the arguments that were presented today or the testimony for 
purposes of trying to create equity here and so I'm going to 
require, number one, that there be a survey completed. A 
survey based on the rough outlines as set forth for the north 
and south portions of the property as identified on the 
exhibit-
f rior.n 
1 Did this come in as a exhibit or is this? 
2 MR, ?: It's six I think. 
3 TfiE COURT: I don't think we've ever admitted this 
i4 larger document. Oh, it came in as a smaller version. 
5 MR. ?: On our version Exhibit 6. 
6 THE COURT: Alright, along the confines for the north 
7 and south portion as represented in Exhibit 6, the parties to 
8 equally shax~e the costs associated with that survey. We'll 
9 take about the survey as it relates to other pieces of 
10 property. 
11 The Court intends by this survey to make this 
12 division equal, both on the frontage that exists to both of the 
13 properties as well as insuring that the gravel pits are on the 
14 south portion as opposed to the north portion, and also 
15 incorporates into the north portion, which the Court would 
16 award to Cathy, the town property piece. 
17 I'm going to require as access to mining claims that 
18 both of the parties have availability from the north portion 
19 for access to those mining claims. I'm going to split the 
20 mining claims down the middle, each party to take four, given 
21 the fact that we have no value testified here today and I have 
22 no ability to make a comparison between the foothill or 
23 mountain property versus the mining claim property to see if 
24 they're roughly equivalent. If they were roughly equivalent or 
25 if they'd been testimony to provide that, the Court may have 
2 
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looked in another direction, but in view of the fact that it's 
probably more cost prohibited than it would actually be worth 
to do it, we'll simply make that division that way and require 
the parties to effect whatever needs to be done to insure that 
this is done in a timely fashion and that they cooperate with 
each other associated with the division of those mining claims 
and whatever recording is required. 
We'll also grant a equal division of the water rights 
on these two pieces with one caveat and that is that whatever 
that division, it can't preclude the north portion of the 
property from having sufficient for the maintenance of one 
dwelling. The testimony and the evidence that has come in 
today appears that there's sufficient water for both portions, 
but if for some reason that turns out not to be the case, 
domestic water on the north portion which is presently being 
used as a habitation is necessary. 
Now, having followed this Exhibit 6 for purposes of a 
division of the north and south property, it seems likewise 
appropriate, based upon the testimony I've heard today, I've 
heard no testimony to suggest that the foothill property that 
is presently purposed is different in any respect, that they're 
roughly equivalent. Indeed, the testimony of somebody whose 
walked the property suggests that they take the north portion 
simply based upon the access and that was Mr. Wood, 
accordingly, and acknowledging that based upon what evidence is 
3 
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presently in front of the Court, it appears that the north 
portion of this property may have more ongoing and continual 
ability to be used in some fashion as opposed to the south 
portion. 
The Court will also require the survey to encompass 
the foothill property and divide it according to the division 
as outlined in roughly equivalent fashion, in an equal fashion 
based upon Exhibit 6. I will allow a revisit however to that 
property, if, after the survey is done there's some really 
geographical reason why that's unfair, but not having that 
evidence in front of me today, it seems to me to be an 
appropriate division of the property. 
Now, north, south, town, foothill, mining claims, 
that leaves me with accounting. It appears that we've had 
several leases on this property over some period of time, some 
as been distributed to both of the parties. I think it 
appropriate for the parties to provide an accounting. Ms. 
Atkin entered into a lease with Mr. Leo Eliopolus (?) and I'm 
assuming nothing was paid on that particular lease but an 
accounting should be provided by Ms. Atkin of any funds paid, 
what the amount of that lease was over the period of time the 
lease was in in exchange with the parties. 
And Mr. Orphecio (?), I'll ask you to do the same 
thing associated with the Parsons lease and the Holliger lease 
so that I might go through my own sense of what an accounting 
4 
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1 would be. I will tell you that I will take into account the 
2 fact that at some point in time these parties felt they had an 
3 agreement and that's important to this Court in terms of how 
4 that allocation of that accounting may have come out. 
5 And I think, Ms. Atkin, in all fairness I'll tell you 
6 that it's going to go against you in terms of an allocation of 
7 monies, if there is an allocation to be made, simply in view of 
8 the fact that we let two years go by without an executed 
9 settlement agreement creating the uncertainty that ends up 
10 being presented there today. 
11 Finally, I'll cake a reservation of the costs on 
12 attorneys' fees once I see the accounting. So I'm leaving only 
13 open two issues. Accounting and attorneys' fees is one issue 
14 and the second Lssue would simply be a visit or a reopener, as 
15 environmental lawyers like to call it, on the issue of 
16 equitable distribution of the foothill property. 
17 Now, having made those rulings based upon the 
18 evidence today and my findings of roughly equivalent value, and 
19 this being an equitable distribution based upon its proposal in 
20 Exhibit 6, is there any issue that I've left out today? 
21 MR. ?: I think with respect to the survey, Your 
22 Honor, I think that we should tie it down a little bit. We're 
23 to provide names of three surveyors within seven days, they're 
24 to pick one or provide a counter list within seven days. If we 
25 can't agree then the Court is involved and picks the surveyor 
5 
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off the list. 
THE COURT: Okay, that sounds like a fair resolution. 
Ms. Costono indicates that: we haven't taken care of 
her an indeed there's no way for this Court to take care of 
you, Ms. Costono. You have a judgment. I'm assuming that 
judgment presently exists on the property in its total and 
it's, you know, the long and short of it is you're a judgment 
creditor of Ms. Atkin and you have some remedies. Those 
remedies exist associated with foreclosure on property or the 
attachment of something of value, motile homes, anything that 
may exist there. Even mining clains that could then be sold to 
Kennecott or to some other willing buyer. There's always 
somebody who has a dream that th ay may hit a goldmine in these 
hills, so there maybe some pot^n:ial buyer out there. 
Alright, counsel, thank you for your presentations 
today, they've been very helpful to the Court. 
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Indispensable Party. ) 
AMENDED 
ORDER OF PARTITION 
Civil No. 000300249 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
This matter came before the Court for trial on 
September 26, 2003. The parties and their counsel were present. 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant own approximately 250 acres 
of real estate and 8 mining claims in Tooele County, Utah. The 
land and mining claims were an inheritance from the parties' 
father, Morley T. Atkin. The property is more particularly 
described on Exhibit XXA" attached hereto. 
2. The Court finds that no formal survey has been 
completed on any of the property. 
3. The Court orders that the property be divided as 
nnocc 
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proposed by Plaintiff in trial exhibit no. 6. 
4. The Court orders the property fronting Highway 36 
to be divided along north-south lines, each parcel to receive 
equal frontage to Highway 36. 
5. The Court orders that Plaintiff receive the south 
end of the highway frontage property which encompasses the gravel 
pit area. The Court orders that the Defendant to receive the 
north side of the highway frontage where she presently resides. 
In addition, Defendant shall receive the 2-1/2 acre parcel at the 
north tip of the property which is zoned for residential 
development. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff's proposal (Exhibit 
6) is equitable with respect to the division of the Foothill 
Property. The Court places weight on the testimony given by Dick 
Wood who actually observed the topography of the Foothill 
Property. The Court reserves the right to revisit the Foothill 
Property partition if necessary. 
7. The Court orders that the Settlement Canyon 
Property (Mountain Property) be divided equally. The Court 
reserves the issue of whether an exchange of mining claims for 
the Mountain Property is equitable. 
8. The Court orders that the parties' mining claims be 
divided equally. The Court reserves the issue of whether the 
mining claims would offset the value of the Settlement Canyon 
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Property (Mountain Property) to determine if there is a more 
equitable way to divide the Settlement Canyon Property. 
9. The Court orders it reserves the issue of access to 
Plaintiff's property through an easement on Defendant's property 
to the existing trail which leads to the mining claims until such 
time as a certified survey is completed. 
10. The Court orders each party to provide the other 
with an accounting of all money paid to improve and/or maintain 
the property being divided so that the Court can determine 
whether a monetary award is appropriate to either party. 
11. The Court orders that it is reasonable and 
necessary for both parties to have equal water. 
12. The Court orders both parties to do anything 
necessary to effectuate the partition of the property and water 
rights ordered by this Courtf including executing titles to any 
trailers and/or mobile homes or other documents. The Court 
orders that any removal of the parties' property be accomplished 
in a manner that does not damage existing fixtures. 
13. The Court orders the parties to obtain a formal 
survey of the property with a division as set forth herein. Each 
party is ordered to pay one-half of the expense of obtaining such 
survey. 
14. The Court orders that each party receive a right 
of first refusal on the sale of the property divided by this 
4 
Order of Partition. 
15. The Court orders that its Order of Partition 
resolves all issues between the parties and Tom Eleopolus, 
including any contempt proceedings. 
DATED this _\ day of &br$£c^ 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Order of 
Partition, postage prepaid, this %Q day of February, 2004, 
addressed as follows: 
Wesley M. Lang, Esq. 
POWELL & LANG 
50 South Main #850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Defendant 
Cathy Atkin 
22575 South Highway 36 
Tooele, UT 84074 
Diane Castagno 
P.O. Box 39 
Tooeler UT 84074 
Legal 
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EXH1B1 1 " h" 
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 
bravel Pit Property 
A. Parcel 06-0Q7-A-Q001 containing appiox. 2.488 acres. 
E Parcel 06-008-0-0008 containing approx. 14b.bO acres. 
The tooth ill Property 
A. Parcel 06-009-0-008 containing approximately 51 acres. 
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